

intersubjectivity with others and appreciating the basis of their convictions, or conversely, preventing such intersubjectivity? and (b) what kinds of meta-criteria and common good should we be guided by in affirming or revising our own ethics of belief? The first may point to social-psychological, behavioral, and phenomenological implications. The second requires that we make a greater effort in infusing moral and existential discussions into our professional discourse. How we as psychologists should place our faith in the future may be informed by the answers to these two questions, as well as by what we can learn from a comprehensive study of the psychology of human beliefs in the context of social existence.

The lack of faith would seem to be a daunting prospect for any individual or human community. On the other hand, a crisis of faith can be an impetus for a renewed, meaningful search. It is not likely that psychologists will be entirely alone in seeking a way of defining humanity's place in the world of moral existence.

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### Belief Versus Faith

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Stanton Jones (March 1994) is to be applauded for his delineation of a practicable interface between religion and psychology. But Jones could have made it clear that he was generally referring only to peripheral aspects of religion in his comparison with scientific exploration.

The basis of science, its most distinguishing element, is its use of an objective method of experimentation in the search for truths or facts. The basis of religion is a subjective method of experience, an intuitive-perceptual search for a no less objective—although nonmaterial—reality: religious truth. (The objective existence of an

entity is not dependent on its ability to be perceived through objective means.) Religion is the increasing experience of spiritual reality, of one's relationship with God.

Jones's (1994) point of reference, the cognitive aspects of religion, is simply individuals' and groups' intellectual responses to that intuitive experience, however dim or enlightened that experience may be. Whether they be doctrines, dogmas, beliefs, moral codes, theologies, or religious philosophies, such reactions are not essentially spiritual; they are essentially what Jones labeled them: cognitive or intellectual. Jones stated, "In using the term *religion* in this article, I am referring to the cognitive dimension of religious belief" (p. 188).

I believe that the integration of science and religion must ultimately go beyond Jones's (1994) "perhaps boldest model yet." It has done so in the lives of many prominent and not-so-prominent scientists and religionists. Many scientists have brought not only their beliefs and presuppositions but, more important, their intellectually enlivening and enlightening experiential awareness of spiritual reality to the scientific enterprise, both in their experimental work and in their relations with their colleagues. And they have made the world a bit of a better place by doing so.

Scientists and religionists need to talk meaningfully with each other. Even more important, the scientific and religious dimensions need to communicate freely within the individual scientist and religionist by offering both critique and constructive insight. To be of meaningful service to society, the scientist must operate according to an enlightened ethic and be guided by ideals that transcend self in the search for scientific understanding. If the religionist's mission and message are not to be hopelessly mired in the past, he or she must be willing to abandon those cherished cognitive beliefs (i.e., long-held religious beliefs) that cannot stand up to the critiques of a well-reasoned science. The religionist must be willing to incorporate new scientific understanding into a flexible religious philosophy. The scientist must give up a narrow scientism to the enlarging perspective of spiritual reality.

Genuine religion need not fear the ever-progressing understandings of science. If *religion* is understood as an experiential search for spiritual truth, and *religions* are defined as institutional or theological systems, then a genuine science need not fear religion, the existence of myriad more or less false religions notwithstanding.

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### Integrating Psychological Science and Religion

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Jones (March 1994) asserted that psychology and religion cannot be considered to be categorically separated and that there should be a constructive, dialectic, and dialogical relationship between them. Although Jones's contention seems to be valid regarding the practice of psychology, we suggest that the fundamental differences between the science of psychology and religion may not be as easily bridged as Jones indicated.

First, we agree that religion could be integrated within the practice of psychology. This position is not novel to Jones's (1994) article (cf. O'Donohue, 1989). Moreover, the roles of clients' and psychotherapists' value and belief systems in psychotherapy have been thoroughly discussed by Bergin (1991), among others. Clients and psychotherapists alike do not leave their values and religion at home. They bring these belief systems with them to psychotherapy, and to the extent that these systems are an integral part of their lives and experiences, they will play an important role in the practice of clinical psychology (Kelly & Strupp, 1992). The connection between psychologists' values and the practice of psychology has been recognized not only in the field of clinical psychology but also in other applied psychology areas, such as industrial and organizational psychology (e.g., Aguinis, 1993).

The relationship between the science of psychology and religion, however, seems to be more problematic than Jones (1994) recognized. Evans (1968), for example, summarized fundamental differences between the languages used by these two modes of inquiry that were not addressed by Jones's arguments. For example, in seeking scientific objectivity, scientists generate assertions (e.g., hypotheses, laws, and theories) that are (a) logically neutral, (b) comprehensible impersonally, and (c) testable by observations. In contrast, religious asser-

tions are (a) not logically neutral, (b) comprehensible experientially, and (c) not testable by observations. These differences led Evans to conclude that in each of these three ways of seeking scientific objectivity, "science differs radically from religion" (p. 111). As a second illustration, Barbour (1974), one of Jones's most frequently cited sources regarding similarities between science and religion, also noted important differences between science and religion that we think should be addressed in any attempt to integrate them. For example, both science and religion use analogical models (see Jones, pp. 189–190); however, religious models serve noncognitive functions that have no parallel in science, elicit more total personal involvement than scientific models, and appear to be more influential than the formal beliefs and doctrines derived from them, whereas scientific models are subservient to theories (Barbour, 1974, p. 69). Numerous other examples of fundamental differences between science and religion can be found elsewhere (e.g., White, 1965; Whitehouse, 1952).

Jones's (1994) thesis for positing a bridge between the science of psychology and religion is that there is enough common ground between the two. Jones asserted that commonalities between religion and science include overlaps regarding subject matter, accountability to experience, goals, use of analogical models, human enterprises, and passionate devotion. However, these similarities are so general and unspecific to religion and could be used to "prove" the existence of similarities between psychology and several other human enterprises. For example, we could compare the science of psychology to art on the basis of these presupposed similarities, and, following Jones's logic, conclude that there should be an integration between art and psychological science because they have a shared ground. For example, if we replace *religion* with *art* in Jones's description of similarities between religion and psychology, we find that psychology and art may share the goals of "making sense out of a very complex existence" (p. 189); both art and science "use analogical models rooted in paradigms or worldviews to explain experience" (p. 189); art and psychology "are human communal and cultural enterprises subject to the same sorts of human influences that affect all of our activities" (p. 190); and "science can in fact elicit and inspire the same type of passionate devotion as religion [art] can" (p. 190). Jones concluded that because of this shared ground, it is clear that an interaction between the science of psychology and religion could take place. However, this "common ground" is so general that it could

apply to other cultural creations such as poetry (and literature in general) as well as to Marxism and numerous other ideologies. Is this common ground sufficient reason to claim that "no hard barrier separates the domain of religious thought and commitment from that domain of human activity that we call science" (Jones, 1994, p. 197)?

We believe that to posit a mutually beneficial relationship between psychological science and religion, one must address the more fundamental and core features pertaining to the essential nature of scientific method and religion (cf. Evans, 1968). In addition, conflicts between science and religion and possible solutions should be examined (cf. Gernster, 1962; White, 1965). For example, Pupin (1969) suggested that conflicts between science and religion can be eluded "when each of them avoids encroaching upon the domain which naturally belongs to the other" (pp. ix–x), and Shideler (1966) argued that "what is required is to explore the characteristic ways of thought that differentiate each realm of inquiry" (p. xi).

Although the conflicts between science and religion were not directly addressed by Jones (1994), it should be noted that his article, perhaps inadvertently, included an example of one of many possible conflicts and a suggestion for its resolution. In arguing that one of the three forms of interaction between psychology and religion is that scientific theories and paradigms can be "examined and evaluated by the individual scientist for their fit with his or her religious presuppositions" (p. 194), Jones asserted that researchers would have the right "to be *unconvinced* by a radical operant behavioral view of the person because the fundamental behavioristic conception of the subject matter of humanity is so radically opposed to a given religion's understanding of persons" (p. 194, italics added). Stated differently, to solve this specific conflict between religion (values and worldviews) and psychological science (empirical evidence), Jones's recommendation was that researchers reject theories and disregard empirical evidence if they oppose their views of humanity and the world.

In summary, fundamental differences between science and religion are widely documented (e.g., Evans, 1968; White, 1965; Whitehouse, 1952). These differences indicate that science and religion are two distinct modes of knowing and explaining reality. These are the fundamental differences and conflicts that need to be addressed to posit that the science of psychology and religion "are not radically incompatible" (Jones, 1994, p. 193) and that a constructive

and mutually influencing integration between the two is possible.

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## Religion and Science Are Mutually Exclusive

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Jones (March 1994) disagreed with the resolution that "religion and science are separate and mutually exclusive realms of human thought" (p. 186), and he proposed several similarities that may serve as a com-

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